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ABSTRACT
Infectious disease outbreaks pose major threats to human 
health and security. Countries with robust capacities 
for preventing, detecting and responding to outbreaks 
can avert many of the social, political, economic and 
health system costs of such crises. The Global Health 
Security Index (GHS Index)—the first comprehensive 
assessment and benchmarking of health security and 
related capabilities across 195 countries—recently found 
that no country is sufficiently prepared for epidemics 
or pandemics. The GHS Index can help health security 
stakeholders identify areas of weakness, as well as 
opportunities to collaborate across sectors, collectively 
strengthen health systems and achieve shared public 
health goals. Some scholars have recently offered 
constructive critiques of the GHS Index’s approach to 
scoring and ranking countries; its weighting of select 
indicators; its emphasis on transparency; its focus on 
biosecurity and biosafety capacities; and divergence 
between select country scores and corresponding COVID-
19- associated caseloads, morbidity, and mortality. Here, 
we (1) describe the practical value of the GHS Index; (2) 
present potential use cases to help policymakers and 
practitioners maximise the utility of the tool; (3) discuss the 
importance of scoring and ranking; (4) describe the robust 
methodology underpinning country scores and ranks; 
(5) highlight the GHS Index’s emphasis on transparency 
and (6) articulate caveats for users wishing to use GHS 
Index data in health security research, policymaking and 
practice.
INTRODUCTION
The Global Health Security Index (GHS 
Index) is a project by the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative and the Johns Hopkins University 
Center for Health Security, with methodo-
logical, research, and analytical support from 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). An 
International Panel of Experts, convened 
by the project team, provided guidance and 
feedback on the development of the GHS 
Index framework. Members of the Interna-
tional Panel of Experts provided advice over 
the course of the GHS Index’s development 
and participated in their personal capacities 
or in their capacities as representatives of 
advising organizations.” The inaugural itera-
tion of the GHS Index was generously funded 
by the Open Philanthropy Project, the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation and the Robertson 
Foundation.
The GHS Index is the first comprehensive 
assessment of health security and related capa-
bilities across the 195 countries that make up 
the States Parties to the International Health 
Regulations (IHR (2005)). It promotes 
meaningful multisectoral engagement to 
complement existing processes for national 
health security needs assessment, prioritisa-
tion, planning and financing, and is a tool 
for measuring country capacities to prevent, 
detect and respond to naturally occurring, 
accidental and deliberate infectious disease 
threats. Building on the World Health Orga-
nization’s (WHO) Joint External Evaluation 
Summary box
 ► Infectious disease outbreaks pose major threats to 
human health and economies.
 ► The Global Health Security Index (GHS Index) can 
help decision makers identify weaknesses in sys-
tems for preventing, detecting and responding to 
outbreaks, while also considering relevant social, 
political and environmental risk factors.
 ► Using publicly available information, the GHS Index 
documents where health security capacities are 
strong and where they are weak.
 ► GHS Index scores and ranks are entry points into 
deeper analyses of health system capacities and 
performance.
 ► GHS Index scores cannot and do not predict how 
countries respond to outbreaks, nor how many cas-
es or deaths a country will report during an outbreak.
 ► Future iterations of the GHS Index will incorporate 
lessons learnt from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
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(JEE) tool, the GHS Index also assesses health system 
preparedness for high- consequence outbreaks, as well as 
socioeconomic and political risk factors that modulate 
vulnerability to epidemic threats. The inaugural GHS 
Index, released in 2019, found that no country is suffi-
ciently prepared for epidemics or pandemics.1
COVID-19 and other recent outbreaks—such as H1N1 
pandemic influenza, Ebola, Nipah and Zika, among 
others—underscore the importance of measuring and 
monitoring country progress towards building robust 
capacities for preventing, detecting and responding to 
known, emerging and re- emerging infectious disease 
threats.2 These outbreaks have also underscored chal-
lenges in measuring global health security capacities. 
Some analyses, for example, have recently highlighted 
discrepancies observed in countries like the USA and the 
UK, which received high GHS Index and JEE Scores, yet 
struggle to suppress cases of COVID-19.3 4
Here, we (1) describe the practical value of the GHS 
Index; (2) present potential use cases to help policy-
makers and practitioners maximise the utility of the 
tool; (3) discuss the importance of scoring and ranking; 
(4) describe the robust methodology underpinning 
country scores and ranks; (5) highlight the GHS Index’s 
emphasis on transparency and (6) articulate caveats for 
users wishing to use GHS Index data in health security 
research, policymaking and practice.
THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF THE GHS INDEX
The GHS Index could serve as a powerful tool for meas-
uring and motivating sustainable financing at national, 
regional and global levels, and its findings could help 
catalyse political will to fill gaps in health security capacity. 
The GHS Index also measures indicators directly related 
to epidemic and pandemic preparedness alongside 
indicators of broader strengths needed to reinforce 
health systems, such as political, security and socioeco-
nomic factors that could shape country risk landscapes 
and capacities to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to 
outbreaks. Additionally, it complements ongoing efforts 
to build accountability for national preparedness, such as 
the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, the Global 
Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and the World Bank 
Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Multi- 
Donor Fund.5
The GHS Index also aggregates otherwise scattered 
qualitative and quantitative data into a consolidated, 
publicly available format that facilitates comparison and 
monitoring, and provides extensive documentation of 
expert- vetted health security capacities and capabilities. 
GHS Index data are thus a valuable complement to after 
action reviews, JEEs and workshops to develop National 
Action Plans for Health Security (NAPHS), as well as 
for drawing comparisons across geographies at the level 
of both individual questions and categories. With data 
collection activities pending for the next iteration of the 
GHS Index, we hope to eventually be able to monitor 
national, regional and global trends in health security- 
strengthening efforts over time, identify when countries 
deprioritise investments and capacities and include new 
measures of pandemic preparedness informed by global 
experiences with COVID-19. Globally and nationally, 
the GHS Index also identifies existing vulnerabilities in 
preparedness for biological threats. Systematically cata-
loguing and monitoring these weaknesses could help 
inform budget allocations and spending decisions, and 
aid policymakers in setting priorities for health security- 
strengthening and health systems- strengthening efforts.
Finally, the GHS Index is valuable in its framing of 
global health security as a multisectoral social project. 
Effective outbreak prevention, for example, depends in 
part on addressing root causes of disease emergence, such 
as those captured in GHS Index indicators examining 
land use changes, veterinary workforces and agricultural 
practices. This multisectoral lens—which incorporates 
measures of country fragility and other political, economic 
and environmental vulnerabilities—creates a tangible 
starting point for One Health coordination platforms or 
national disaster management committees to work across 
sectors, engage non- traditional partners and formulate 
multisectoral solutions to complex health challenges. 
Though processes like JEEs and NAPHS development 
are intended to be multisectoral, it is the health sector 
that most often functions as the entry point for other 
stakeholders and sectors that may not have explicit 
mandates to strengthen health security.6 The GHS Index 
thus recognises—and measures—the benefits of whole- 
of- society approaches to health security that transcend 
any one sector.
THE VALUE OF SCORING AND RANKING
Scoring is an intuitive method of summarising complex 
health system capacities across diverse contexts, moni-
toring longitudinal and cross- sectional trends and advo-
cating for needed policy change. Scoring is also used 
widely across many areas of global health, economic, 
policy and development research, as well as in established 
health security evaluation tools like the JEE.7–10
In general, scoring is an effective method for measuring, 
motivating and monitoring efforts to strengthen infec-
tious disease management capacities across high- income, 
middle- income and low- income settings alike. The Africa 
Leaders Malaria Alliance, for example, produces score-
cards that track country progress in improving financing, 
capacity- building and increasing coverage of health 
services for malaria, neglected tropical diseases and 
malnutrition.11 And, between 2012 and 2016, publication 
of scores from the Nuclear Security Index (produced by 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative and developed with EIU) 
encouraged 10 countries to remove or dispose of highly 
enriched uranium within their territories.12 The Human 
Development Index has similarly emerged as a valu-
able tool for guiding decision making and monitoring 
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policymaking at both national and subnational levels in 
many countries.8
In this vein, the GHS Index provides high- level 
composite scores for each country and offers consider-
able granularity and transparency in scoring justifications 
at the indicator and sub- indicator levels, with the aim of 
helping decision makers pinpoint discrete capacities 
that require strengthening. Notably, GHS Index scores 
have been used by some countries to create new metrics 
of health security. For example, Malaysia’s Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation—in collaboration 
with PEMANDU Associates and the Sunway Group—has 
developed a Global COVID-19 Recovery Index (GCI). 
GCI Scores are calculated from dynamic estimates of 
confirmed cases and death rates by country (which 
receive a weight of 70%), along with static measures 
of prevention capacities (GHS Index, category 1) and 
public health vulnerability (GHS Index, Indicator 6.5), 
which receive a weight of 30%.13
Like scoring, ranking is an effective way to galvanise 
change in low- performing countries and identify outliers, 
such as countries that score unexpectedly well despite 
limited resources, or those that rank poorly despite 
undertaking capacity- building efforts. Outliers, in turn, 
should prompt deeper analyses of such findings.14 Morse 
writes, too, that ‘the ‘league table’ style of presenting 
rankings is…meant to be picked up by the media, and 
through them the public, non- government organisations, 
pressure groups, aid agencies and so on, and ultimately 
provide pressure on decision makers to bring about 
positive change.’15 Regardless of their overall score and 
rank, all countries—including high- performing states—
should examine specific GHS Index indicators closely 
as a means of identifying critical weaknesses to address 
through capacity- building, funding, legislation or other 
approaches (see the Considerations for GHS Index users 
section).
A ROBUST, PRACTITIONER-INFORMED METHODOLOGY
Data for each of the GHS Index’s 34 indicators and 85 
sub- indicators were either sourced from existing reposi-
tories stewarded by reputable groups like WHO, or qual-
itatively assessed by EIU researchers. Qualitative data 
were scored on a binary or categorical scale. To minimise 
researcher bias and subjectivity in scoring, we employed 
binary indicators wherever possible. Measurements were 
normalised on a 0–100 scale to facilitate reproducible 
cross- country, cross- indicator and cross- category compar-
ison. Detailed justifications, sources and scoring criteria 
are provided for each indicator in the GHS Index model, 
report and website to ensure both appropriate contextu-
alisation and reproducibility.
Data review and validation comprised a year- long 
process involving multiple researchers vetting scores, 
data and justifications in stages to ensure consistency 
across countries. The model’s default ‘expert’ weights 
were derived from extensive deliberation and input from 
the GHS Index International Panel of Experts, a group of 
21 subject matter experts in health security representing 
organizations in 13 countries.16 However, recognising that 
no single weighting scheme can reflect every country’s 
priorities, we also built flexibilities into the GHS Index 
model: users can customise weights based on context- 
specific considerations, priorities or other criteria, and 
country scores and rankings adjust accordingly.
SELECTING AND HARMONISING METRICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH 
SECURITY
The GHS Index conceptualises a health security capacity 
as a state’s ability or potential to carry out a discrete public 
health or healthcare function necessary to prevent, 
detect or respond to acute infectious disease threats, 
be they naturally occurring, accidental or deliberate. 
Featured indicators in the GHS Index are intended to aid 
users in monitoring and measuring the investments and 
processes that enable states to build, sustain and imple-
ment these capacities. The GHS Index does not, however, 
purport to forecast health outcomes or impacts resulting 
from country investments in strengthening health secu-
rity capacities.
Some have asserted that the indicators selected for 
inclusion in the GHS Index may reflect a systematic bias 
towards higher- income countries.17 Given that national 
gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita 
correlate only weakly with overall GHS Index scores—as 
evidenced by Pearson’s r values of 0.37 and 0.45, respec-
tively—this seems unlikely. Fidler writes, however, that 
global health security ‘ultimately depends on the quality 
of national public health systems.’18 As such, we have 
taken care to include indicators in the GHS Index that 
measure material determinants of country- level health 
security capacities, such as preparedness spending—
which do correlate strongly with national income.
However, the GHS Index also incorporates social, 
political, technical and environmental determinants 
of health security, which do not necessarily correlate 
directly with national income level alone. On measures 
of healthcare access (Indicator 4.3), for example, the 
first- ranking, second- ranking and fifth- ranking countries 
were Thailand (upper- middle- income), Georgia (lower- 
middle- income) and Nigeria (lower- middle- income), 
respectively. Other factors, such as strength of labora-
tory systems (Indicator 2.1) and international commit-
ments (Indicator 5.3), also correlate more strongly with 
overall GHS Index scores (r=0.80 and 0.76, respectively) 
than with overall GDP (r=0.25 and 0.23, respectively). To 
further prevent potential confounding by income level, 
users might consider comparing overall, indicator and 
sub- indicator- level scores across countries within a given 
income group and adjusting model weights to align 
more closely with the specific health priorities of a given 
country or region.
Moreover, indicators were developed with the aim 
of ensuring the GHS Index’s integration with existing 
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global health security assessment tools and frameworks 
such as the GHSA, the JEE and the IHR Monitoring and 
Evaluation Framework, as well as the NAPHS develop-
ment process, as Razavi et al recommend. However, other 
scholars have highlighted a need for global health secu-
rity metrics that do not simply mirror global patterns of 
wealth distribution, and that more accurately capture 
health system functionality and performance rather than 
capacity alone.19 20 Though the GHS Index does extrapo-
late beyond the metrics featured in the aforementioned 
frameworks to encompass novel measures of risk, vulner-
ability and health system readiness, its primary goals 
remain (1) supporting and enhancing existing health 
security- strengthening mechanisms in a comprehensive, 
accessible format; and (2) motivating decision makers in 
all countries to make needed investments in epidemic 
and pandemic preparedness.
Thus, while more meaningful metrics of health security 
capacity are certainly warranted and merit deeper consid-
eration by the international community, we contend that 
developing these metrics supersedes the original inten-
tion of the GHS Index to leverage existing, publicly avail-
able data. However, as we learn from COVID-19, we do 
plan to revise the GHS Index Framework to include new, 
more targeted measures of pandemic readiness (see the 
Next steps section).
CONSIDERATION OF BIOSECURITY, BIOSAFETY, HEALTH 
SYSTEMS AND CATASTROPHIC THREATS
The GHS Index treats biosafety and biosecurity as vital 
components of global health security. As such, the tool 
includes numerous indicators measuring country capac-
ities in these areas. Admittedly, health priorities in many 
low/middle- income countries (LMICs) often differ from 
those of their wealthier counterparts, and many LMICs 
may have limited capacities to prioritise biosafety and 
biosecurity.17 However, the health and security risks 
associated with dual- use research, accidental releases of 
pathogens and deliberate misuse of biological materials 
are not equitably distributed across countries. LMICs 
are more likely to experience significant morbidity and 
mortality if these threats manifest, and unless steps are 
taken to monitor and strengthen their respective biose-
curity and biosafety capacities, they will remain dispro-
portionately vulnerable.
The GHS Index’s approach to biosecurity and biosafety 
aligns with that of the IHR (2005), which require core 
health system competencies that apply universally to all 
countries regardless of income level. It is worth noting, 
too, that while category 1 of the GHS Index includes many 
biosecurity and biosafety indicators, it is not weighted 
more heavily than other categories: category 1 scores as 
a whole account for only 16.3% of a country’s total score, 
while scores for biosecurity and biosafety indicators each 
determine approximately 2.6% of a country’s overall 
score. Including these indicators in the GHS Index also 
aligns with international health security norms, such as 
those articulated in the IHR (2005), the JEE, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health’s Performance of Veter-
inary Services Evaluations, the GHSA, the Biological 
Weapons Convention and the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention has also prioritised these capacities through 
its continent- wide Initiative on Strengthening Biosafety 
and Biosecurity, which aligns with both the JEE and IHR 
implementation.21
The GHS Index also measures domains not explicitly 
captured in other health security assessment tools, such as 
health system readiness and preparedness for global cata-
strophic biological risks (GCBRs). The Johns Hopkins 
Center for Health Security defines GCBRs as ‘events in 
which biological agents—whether naturally emerging or 
reemerging, deliberately created and released or labo-
ratory engineered and escaped—could lead to sudden, 
extraordinary, widespread disaster beyond the collective 
capability of national and international governments and 
the private sector to control.’22 While the JEE’s biosafety 
and biosecurity indicators are undoubtedly vital metrics 
of GCBR preparedness, some health system capacities 
not sufficiently captured in the tool—such as abilities 
to test, approve and dispense new medical countermea-
sures—are also essential to GCBR prevention and miti-
gation. The GHS Index goes above and beyond the JEE 
in this regard, featuring a dedicated category focusing 
exclusively on health system capacities required to miti-
gate epidemic threats. This was the lowest- scoring cate-
gory across all countries in the GHS Index: 131 countries 
ranked in the lowest tier of scores, highlighting critical 
vulnerabilities in global capacities to care for sick patients 
and protect health workers during public health emer-
gencies, including GCBRs.1 A comprehensive list of 
GHS Index indicators measuring GCBR preparedness is 
provided in the inaugural report.1
TRANSPARENCY AND INTEGRATION WITH THE JEE
Transparency is a cornerstone of global cooperation 
around health security capacity- building and emergency 
response. It enables decision makers to track how global 
health initiatives are financed, detect and respond quickly 
to emergent outbreaks, coordinate responses with inter-
national partners and ensure accountability in public–
private partnerships.23–27 COVID-19 has recently reaf-
firmed the importance of transparency in case reporting, 
surveillance and containment, especially as countries 
take steps to resume routine economic, social and educa-
tional activities. Transparency in scientific practice has 
also proven crucial during COVID-19. For example, open 
exchanges of clinical data, biological samples, genetic 
sequence data, modelling parameters and assumptions 
and epidemiological data support evidence- based policy-
making around reopening schools and economies, fore-
casting demand for healthcare services and equitable 
allocation of scarce resources.28–31
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Given the demonstrated importance of transpar-
ency in coordinating effective multilateral responses to 
pandemic threats, the GHS Index also prioritises publicly 
available evidence of relevant capacities. Thus, countries 
without publicly documented evidence of these capaci-
ties receive lower scores. The drawback of this approach 
is that a country possessing a given capacity without 
sharing corresponding evidence via official channels 
may receive an artificially low score. To reduce the risk 
of under- scoring, we invited government officials at 195 
embassies and missions to the United Nations to review 
our data with their respective National IHR Focal Points, 
course- correct our work and share additional informa-
tion. However, only 16 countries responded to these 
requests, for which only minimal changes to scoring were 
necessary.1
The GHS Index is underpinned by the principle that 
‘a health threat anywhere is a health threat everywhere,’ 
an ethos championed by the architects of the GHSA.32 
We believe that data describing national health secu-
rity capacities should be a public good. In this spirit, 
we anchored the GHS Index in publicly available data 
and made the tool itself—and all its data—freely avail-
able. To ensure alignment with the JEE and integration 
of all publicly available information shared by countries, 
the GHS Index also draws heavily from WHO’s reposi-
tory of publicly available JEE reports. Moving forward, we 
strongly encourage all countries to document relevant 
capacities publicly—both in the interest of global coop-
eration and transparency, and to improve the fidelity of 
future monitoring efforts.
LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL AND SECURITY RISKS, AND TRUST IN 
GOVERNMENT
Some experts have rightly observed an inverse rela-
tionship between overall GHS Index scores and subop-
timal COVID-19 outcomes in some high- income coun-
tries—most notably, the USA, which despite having the 
highest overall GHS Index score, currently reports the 
highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases of any 
country.3 30 33 34 In fact, JEE Scores for both the USA and 
the UK share the same inverse relationship with reported 
COVID-19 outcomes.
There are several possible explanations for these 
observed disparities. For example, while the USA does 
maintain strong overall capacities for preventing, 
detecting and responding to epidemic and pandemic 
threats, ineffective federal leadership and an inability 
to deploy available capacities may have precluded 
a concerted whole- of- government response to the 
pandemic. Still, despite a high overall score, some of 
the USA’s category- specific scores—specifically, those 
in category 4 (health system) and category 6 (risk envi-
ronment)—do, in fact, reflect these vulnerabilities. The 
USA ranks 175th out of 195 countries on healthcare 
access, 75th in the world for number of hospital beds and 
earned a score of only 60.4/100 for clinic, hospital and 
community care capacity.35 Similarly, the USA ranks 59th 
out of 195 countries on measures of socioeconomic and 
political resilience and received a zero on measures of 
public confidence in government.35 Thus, even in high- 
scoring countries, weak governance, poor leadership 
and inconsistent risk messaging could impede effective 
implementation and coordination of core health security 
functions during outbreak response. And, as we explain 
further in the next section, country scores solely reflect 
the presence or absence of critical health security capac-
ities. They alone do not—and cannot—provide causal 
explanations for reported health outcomes.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR GHS INDEX USERS
Some researchers have turned to the GHS Index to eluci-
date observed between- country disparities in COVID-
19- associated morbidity, mortality and case fatality esti-
mates.4 30 33 36 However, drawing simple correlations with 
countries’ overall scores does not account for the fact 
that these scores are meant to capture capacities span-
ning the breadth of the health security life cycle, from 
outbreak prevention at the source, to early detection, to 
rapid response. In other words, overall scores summarise 
country capacities across all categories. However, coun-
tries with high overall scores may still have low category- 
level, indicator- level and sub- indicator- level scores that 
more strongly influence outbreak- associated outcomes. 
Therefore, we encourage users wishing to analyse corre-
lations between country scores and health outcomes to 
examine scores at more granular levels, adjust model 
weights to reflect country contexts and priorities and 
consider more nuanced outcomes when analysing coun-
tries’ performances during outbreaks. For example, users 
might examine relationships between category 2 (detec-
tion) scores and the number of misidentified or under- 
reported cases in a given country, rather than examining 
correlations between countries’ overall scores and abso-
lute case counts.
Furthermore, we stress that implementation of health 
security capacities is rarely—if ever—a linear process. In 
other words, the mere presence of a given capacity does 
not always translate predictably into a desired health 
outcome or impact. Conceptualising health systems as 
complex adaptive systems may offer more insight into the 
varied pathways by which countries achieve public health 
goals. Rickles et al37 note, for example, that single events 
can have long- lasting effects on complex systems (‘history 
matters’), a phenomenon known as path dependence. 
Paina and Peters further explicate this point, describing 
how path dependence can complicate health system 
evolution, particularly in the context of rapidly changing 
technology and when diverse stakeholders are involved—
as is the case in the global health security space.38 They 
also highlight the futility of transposing health system 
innovations from countries where they have succeeded 
into countries with different political processes, or that 
have not established the institutions or systems required 
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for said innovations to succeed. This might further 
explain why countries with similar levels of capacity 
(as indicated by GHS Index scores) might nevertheless 
report divergent COVID-19 outcomes.
Composite scores and quantitative correlations are thus 
useful, but alone are insufficient tools for determining 
causal relationships between health system capacities 
and observed health outcomes. The GHS Index’s trans-
parent accounting of country capacities across various 
domains of health security is intended to function as a 
gateway to more nuanced case study analyses, in- country 
evaluations or after- action assessments that could help 
elucidate the causal mechanisms underpinning observed 
health outcomes during or after an outbreak. These 
latter approaches are better- suited to answering why, with 
respect to COVID-19, high- scoring countries like the 
USA, the UK, Sweden and Brazil have fared significantly 
worse than similarly high- ranked states like Thailand, 
and even compared with lower- ranked states like New 
Zealand, Vietnam and the Republic of Korea.
Such analyses of health system dynamics across specific 
country contexts are beyond the scope of the GHS Index 
itself, which solely monitors and documents the presence 
or absence of critical health security capacities. There-
fore, to maximise the utility of the GHS Index, users 
should couple reviews of country scores with additional 
modes of data collection and analysis to answer questions 
regarding relationships between health capacities and 
health outcomes. Such approaches might include key 
informant interviews, surveys, in- country observations, 
case study analyses, focus groups or participatory action 
research methods.
Importantly, users should also note that the GHS 
Index is not a forecasting tool. Rather, it offers a cross- 
sectional snapshot of countries’ health security capacities 
as measured at one point in time. It cannot and does 
not predict whether or how a country will leverage avail-
able capacities to mitigate an unfolding crisis, nor does 
it make assumptions about the political decision- making 
processes underpinning these efforts. Furthermore, the 
inaugural GHS Index—which features data collected 
between 2018 and 2019 and was released in September 
2019—does not account for many countries’ efforts to 
scale up testing and healthcare capacities in response 
to COVID-19, nor whether these efforts could be readily 
leveraged for future emergencies.
Finally, we reiterate that scores in all categories are 
intended to provide a comprehensive snapshot, based on 
publicly available data, of country capacities in these areas. 
Scores and their accompanying justifications are meant 
to inform—not supplant—country efforts to under-
take JEEs and prioritise health security- strengthening 
measures in their respective NAPHS.
NEXT STEPS
Efforts are currently underway to further refine the GHS 
Index based on constructive feedback from experts and 
lessons learnt since the original model was developed. 
However, the GHS Index’s overarching finding still 
holds true: that no country is sufficiently prepared for 
epidemics or pandemics.1 The project team and Inter-
national Panel of Experts fully anticipate that the GHS 
Index will undergo iterative refinement as stakeholders 
continue using the tool, identify shortcomings and learn 
more about COVID-19 and other diseases that may 
emerge in the future.
In light of the faults laid bare by COVID-19, we have 
already begun reexamining indicators of leadership, trust 
in government and political risk. The next iteration of 
the GHS Index, slated to release in 2021, will also empha-
sise other indicators that COVID-19 has shown to be vital 
for pandemic response, particularly those capturing state 
capacity to sustain societal functioning during a major 
outbreak. At present, we tentatively anticipate adding 
metrics of government effectiveness, as well as measures 
examining contact tracing and data sharing. We also 
anticipate revising several existing questions and adding 
over 20 new questions addressing zoonotic disease spill-
over events, scaling of testing capacities, abilities to test 
for novel pathogens, non- pharmaceutical interventions, 
private sector participation in exercises, risk communi-
cation, mis- information and disinformation, trade and 
travel, health security financing, social cohesion, illicit 
activities carried out by non- state actors, supply chains 
for medical supplies, laboratory supplies and medical 
countermeasures. Drawing further from the COVID-19 
experience, we may also revisit weighting schemes for 
select categories and indicators.
In the longer term, we hope that the global health secu-
rity community examines bigger- picture methodological 
issues around health security metrics. Many commonly 
used indicators of health security capacity—including 
those featured in the GHS Index, JEE and IHR Monitoring 
and Evaluation Framework—reflect a highly technocratic 
conceptualisation of outbreak prevention, detection and 
response. This framing likely fails to account for many 
social, institutional and cultural determinants of health 
system functioning and population health.
Furthermore, many of the indicators featured across 
all of these tools are investment- focused and capacity- 
focused. Future monitoring and evaluation efforts might 
benefit from deeper engagement with outcomes of health 
systems- strengthening and health security- strengthening 
efforts, such as health service coverage, health equity and 
health system failures. Subsequent iterations of the GHS 
Index specifically will have to contend with gaps in public 
data availability that disproportionately affect scores in 
LMICs. Inclusion of metrics capturing the quality and 
effectiveness of decision- making during a crisis might 
strengthen the tool even further.
CONCLUSION
Our increasingly interconnected world is only as strong 
as its weakest links. In the face of known, emerging 
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and evolving infectious disease threats that respect no 
borders—and given the importance of multilateral 
approaches to improving health security—it is more 
important than ever for the global community to take 
stock of its strengths and vulnerabilities and capitalise 
on opportunities to chart paths towards a safer, securer 
world.
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